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9938

1

Defendants and Respondents .

.t\1 1 PEI~I . i\X'r'S

REPL 1_'" TO RESPONDEN'"fS'
BRIEF

REPLl"'" TO RESPONDENTS' STATE:\IENT

OF FACTS
Respondents indicate that appellant's staten1ent
of facts are ''incomplete and merely show the facts and
i~sues as the appellant contends them to be and not as
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they. were necessarily viewed by the trial court". They
then proceed to state the facts as they see them..
~..

Our only comment on this is that inasmuch as the
jury found the issues in appellant's favor and inasmuch
as there is ample evidence to support every material fact
set forth and documented in appellant's brief, appellant
'vas and is entitled to view the_ evidence in a light most
favorable to appellant, whereas respondents are not
entitled to this privilege. And in view of the great weight
of evidence in favor-of appellant's view of the facts aud
of the paucity or complete absence of any real evidence
to support the allegations of respondents where they
conflict with the facts as set forth by appellant, the trial
court likewise is precluded from asserting its view: where
that view is contrary to the jury's findings.
All t~hrough the trial and even now in their brief
respondents have minimized and do now minimize
plaintiff's injuries in spite of the solid and weighty evidence pertaining thereto. The jury believed plaintiff's
evidence and they were not caught up in respondents'
light-hearted treatment of plaintiff's damages. For
example, even now defendants still talk as if they are
not a'Yare of the fact that plaintiff's pain, which is permanent, is not a result of an inflamed bursa, and that
it "ras the inflamed bursa only which the operation was
able to correct-and did correct. But the other shoulder
damage is beyond repair, of which fact respondents appear to be quite unaware.
Other illustrations might be given of respondents'
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refusal to sec the fncts as seen by the jury, but \Ve \viii
l'ontcnt oursel,·es 'vith the request that the court Yie'v
the evidence as related in appellant's brief, and that
where there is any conflict of evidence as to material
facts as set forth respectiYely by the parties, such facts
should be resolved in favor of the appellant and as
found hy the jury.

l{El>L\r 'fO RESPONDEN'fS' POINT I
'fhere is nothing in Article 8, Section 9 of the
Constitution of the State of Utah, nor in Rule 7:2,
whieh \vould preclude this court from deciding this
ease at this time if the court finds that the trial court
abused its discretion. Our discussion of this point is
found under Point I,. . of appellant's brief and in our
l{eply to Respondents' Point IX herein. Until the
trial court abuses its discretion, it may retain control
of the case by a ne\v trial order from which an appeal
Ina y not be in order. But an abuse of discretion is another Inatter and this court has not shrunk from giving
relief from such rulings.
l{espondents make a point of our failure to state
in our brief that appellant ,s petition for an interlocutory
appeal in this case \vas denied. In the petition "?e referred to the fact that "?e \Vere filing an appeal, and
"·e believe that it is a fair inference that this court
denied the petition for the reason that it would have a
better opportunity to consider the case more thoroughly
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"\vhen reviewed under the usual appeal procedure. It
did not occur to us that a reference in our appeal brief
to the other procedure was of any consequence, or that
thereby we would be advising the court as to something
of which it was not already aware.
Respondents then quote from the case of National
Farmers Union Property and Casualty Company vs.
'fhon1pson ( 1955), 4 Utah 2d 7, 286 Pac. 2d, 249, as
follows:
"An order granting a new trial is different in
character than an order denying one. 1,he latter
terminates the cause, while the former operates
to vacate the judgment and reinstate the case
as one undisposed of before the court, and over
which the court retains jurisdiction."
In the Farmers Union case the trial judge, after
jury verdict and judgment in favor of defendant permitting defendant to retain $2,000.00 paid him by the
plaintiff insurance company for fire loss to a frame
building, entered a conditional order to the effect that
a new trial be granted unless the defendant, within ten
days, filed· his consent to reduce the amount of $2000.00
so allowed by the jury to $1000.00, which the judge
said was the value of the building' as found by him. The
defendant did not consent to the reduction and moved
to set aside the conditional order. Five months after
the 1notion 'vas argued, the trial judge vacated the order
for a new trial and reinstated the judgment and restored
the jury finding of $2000.00 as the value of the buildIng. The plaintiff insurance company then challenged
4
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t.his n•storative aetion of the court on the theory that
once the trial court granted a ne\V trial, it "·as po,verless to vncnte such an order.
1~ u t this court held that the trial court could vacate
its order bceause it \Vas vacating an order yrantiny a

new trial ,vhil'h \vas different in that factual setting
front an order dcn,IJing a new trial.
'rhe real difference, however, upon a careful reading of the case, is that while an order granting a ne"'
trial is different from an order denying a new trial in
that one n1ust appeal from the latter if he seeks relief,
this does not tnean that one ~null/ not a peal from an order
granting a ne\\· trial "·here, in granting the ne\v trial,
the court abused its discretion.

IlEI~LY

TO RESPONDENTS' POINT II

.t\ll that respondents say in Point II of their brief
Is pretnised upon the idea that some minor injuries
suffered by appellant in 1957 had a relationship to the
bursa infianunation in plaintiff's shoulder, which Dr.
Pen1berton corrected by surgery. To keep this problem
in its proper perspective \Ve here emphasize that the
bursa injury is not the injury 'vhich has caused plaintiff's partial pern1anent disability.
e deal 'vith this
n1atter under Point II of our brief on pages 35-38.

''r

Because plaintiff, in the medical history given Dr.
J>etuberton, did not refer to these 1957 incidents, which
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occurred well over two years prior to the January 19,
1960, accident, the respondents catalog the medical history as untrue. 'fhere is not the slightest evidence that
either incident in 1957 resulted in any damage or pain
whatsoever except for a day or two of discomfort at the
time they occurred. Yet, unless one assumes, contrary to
all the evidence in the Inatter, that plaintiff had pain and
discomfort for over two years either intermittently or
continuously up to the time of the January 19, 1960.
accident, there could be no possible reason for plaintiff
referring to such inconsequential events in giving a
medical history of his January 19, 1960, accident.
In atte1npting to reduce the facts to a choice of
uncertain probabilities as to the cause of the bursa
inflammation, respondents observe that none of the
doctors could say when plaintiff received his inflamed
bursa, independent of plaintiff's statements to them. It
is true that any doctor would have to rely on what the
appellant said. But respondents don't want to rely
on what he said and they don't want the doctors to rely
on what he said. He said the 1957 incidents left no
damage and no pain, that within a day or two these
injuries were all healed and cleared up and that he had
no pain or suffering whatsoever until the accident of
January 19, 1960. The origin of plaintiff's pain was
January 19, 1960, and it was therefore this accident
and the pains incident thereto that he described to Dr.
Pemberton. Dr. Pemberton believed this accident to be
the source of plaintiff's pain, and at the time of the
trial he still believed it. Dr. Pemberton not only related
6
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the s pecifit· injury of the inflamed bursa to the January
IH, IUHO, accident but he found that accident to be the
soun·e of nll of plaintiff's injuries in the region of his
shoulder.

Iti~:I)L \T

'fO RESPONDEN'1'S' POIN'"f III

Our treatment of this subject is found under Point
III of our brief beginning at Page 39.
\ \'" e do observe, however, that here again respondents, in ref erring to the medical history, state that
''this \vas found not to be true". Found by whom?
Certainly not the jury. The record does not reveal it.
It is found only in the minds of the respondents. And
'rhen respondents say that appellant himself personnlly did all the 'vork on his home remodelling, they ignore the record. The evidence is that he helped a little,
nnrl only as much as his disabled arm and shoulder
pern1itted, and that he did this work for the very purJH lsr of giYing his arm and shouder the exercise necessary to redeYelop and reactivate them from the disuse
and atrophy resulting from the operation.

REPLl"'" 'fO RESPOXDENTS' POINT , . .
In Yie'v of the record and of the remarks of the
trial judge during arguments on the motion for a new
trial there can be no question that the trial judge con-
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sistently rejected respondents' view that work1nen's
compensation was plaintiff's exclusive remedy. Nevertheless, respondents have raised the issue here, and the
reply which follows is offered for this court's consideration in the event it decides to consider and pass upon
respondents' Point V.
The facts of the case as they pertain to this issue
are reviewed as follows:
On January 19, 1960, plaintiff was an employee of
Utah Sand and Gravel Company. He was a truck
driver whose job was to deliver ready-mix cement to
the locations provided by his employer. The employer's
establishment is located in North Salt Lake on Beck
Street, where the truck receives the ready-mix. On the
date in question, the plaintiff was dispatched by his
en1ployer with a load of ready-mix cement to be delivered to the L.D.S. Church at Wasatch Boulevard
and 13th South, where the Church was erecting a new
chapel. To assist the Church in conveying the cement
from the truck to the place where it was being used
for the foundation of the building, the Church .had
contracted with Acme Crane Rental Company to furnish a crane and a crane operator for such purpose.
When the plaintiff drove upon the building site at
approximately I :00 p.m. of said day, the crane was in
the process of unloading the ready-mix truck just ahead
of the plaintiff's truck ":hich consisted of the cement
being poured from the truck into the crane bucket and
then from the crane bucket after it had been lifted to
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the point \vhere the l~hureh foreman or his helpers
ind.icuted the <Tinent should be poured. After the truck
ahead of hint had pulled away the plaintiff then backed
his truck up to the crane bucket for the purpose of
unloading in the sa1ne way and manner as the previous
truek.
1.,here are thus three separate employers involved
in this operation: 'fhe Church, the Acme Crane Rental
Cornpany. and the Utah Sand and Gravel Company.
In spite of the facts, respondents claim, in contcnlplation of the applicable statutes, that plaintiff and
~\cn1e l""rane Rental Company were employees of the
l~hurch and, therefore, plaintiff's only remedy against
either the Church or Acme is that which is provided
by \vorkn1en's compensation. The record shows that
plaintiff's counsel represents the State Insurance Fund
in this case to the extent of its subrogation rights from
plaintiff against respondents. ( R. 186) .
SEl'1.TIOX 35-1-.t2 WAS NEVER INTEND}~D TO BE. XOR IS IT, A GUIDE TO THE INTEl~I)RE1.,..:\'fiOX OF 35-1-62, U.C.A. 1953.
Section 35-1-62 reads in part as follows: "When
any injury * * * for \Yhich compensation is payable
under this title shall have been caused by the wrongful
act or neglect of another person not in the same employiuent, the injured employee, * * * may claim comprn~ation and the injured employee * * * may also
haYe an action for dan1ages against such third person.''
9
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The phrase "not in the same employment" found in
the above is limited to employees of the same employer
in the restrictive sense of the term and is not to be confused with the more liberal definition of employer as
found in 35-1-42 as expressed in the following excerpts:
"Regularly employed in the satne business, or
in or about the same establishment under any
contract of hire";
"The term 'regularly' as herein used shall include all employments in the usual course of the
trade, business, profession or occupation of the
employer, whether continuous throughout the
year or for only a portion of the year";
"Where any employer procures any work to
be done wholly or in part for him by a contractor
over whose work he retains supervision or control, and such work is a part or process in the
trade or business of the employer, such contractor,and all persons employed by him, and all subcontractors under him, and all persons employed
by any such subcontractors, shall be deemed,
within the meaning of this section, employees of
such original employer."
35-1-42 was enacted io prevent the evasion of the

Act by many -employers who parcel out, under guise
of contracts, the work among many so-called contractors
while retaining supervision and control of the work.
It was legislation to prev~nt employers from defeating
the A.ct by reducing through a subterfuge the amount
of employees covered by the Act. See Angel et al vs.
Industrial C.ommission of Utah, 64 Utah 105.
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;),)-1-~;~ \ras enacte<l for the purpose of per1nitting

suit n.~ninst a third party tortfeasor \\·ho 'vas not the
in.i ured party's actual e1nployer (using the term enlployer here in its usual connotation and not inthe more
general use as defined in 35-1-42) and who had no responsibility to carry workmen's compensation for the
injurc<l party. In such a case 35-1-62 seeks to make
\':hole the insurance company's loss as well as to retain
the con1n1on la'v rights of suit by the injured party.
Inusrnueh as these two sections deal with separate and
unrelated problems, it would be contrary to the rules of
lcg·islatiYe interpretation to construe the sections as one.
On the occasions "·hen 35-1-62 have been before
this C'ourt, it has been made plain that this section
\ras not to be interpreted in a restrictive sense so as to
defeat the legislative intent. See Johanson vs. Cudahy
Packing C'o., 107 Utah 114, 152 Pac. 2nd 98. Also,
l~ogalski Ys. Phillips Petroleum Co., 3 Utah 2nd 203.
In the latter case, the issue \vas raised as to whether the
State Insurance Fund had to be joined as a necessary
party plaintiff. In considering the matter, the court said:
'~.L-\ppellant

claims that U.C.A., 1953, 35-1-62,
n1ust be interpreted to give the sole right of
action to the insurance carrier after the carrier
has paid compensation and cites the language of
the statute: ' * * * The employer or insurance
carrier shall become trustee of the cause of action
against the third party and may bring and maintain the action either in its own name or in the
name of the insured employee'. Certainly~ this
language does give the insurance carrier a right
11
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

of action, but it Wa8 not meant to abrogate the
language preceding this quotation which provides_, ~when any injury or death for which compensation is payable under this title shall have
been caused by the wrongful act or neglect of
another * * * the injured employee * * * may
also have an action for damages against such
third person"'."'"' (Our emphasis).
It is instructive to note the fact situation in this
case. The plaintiff was an employee of the third party's
distributing agent. And the accident happened while
the plaintiff was on the third party's premises washing
his employer's truck which carried the third party's
name, trade marks and colors, and while using the third
party's truck cleaning facilities. In spite of all this
chain of agency and community of interest the court
emphasizes that 35-1-62 granted plaintiff the right to
sue such third party. In the Johanson case, above cited,
the court stated that it was not the legislative purpose
in the enactment of this section to create a shield for a
third party tortfeasor. It was not intended to limit or
proscribe the liability of such a wrongdoer. It was
designed to permit an employer or insurance carrier
who pays compensation in accordance with the act to
participate in the recovery had from the third party
tortfeasor, the participation being limited to the amount
of compenstaion paid, plus the cost of collecting fro1n
the wrongdoer. And the only concern of the third party
is that he be effectively protected against double suit
for the same wrong, that is to say, that the suit be
brought in the name of the real party in interest and
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that all those haYing an interest in the subject n1atter
of the litigation be bound by the judgment.

I>J .. \IX'r II~,I~, IS NOT AN E~II>LOYEE 01~,
~\X\'" <>I,~ 'rilE l)EFEND1\NTS E\'"EN Blr THE
~~~ll)LO\'"Elt-E:\II>I~O\~EE S'fANDARDS 01
35-1-1:! •\X ll a~3-I-.ta, U.C.A., 1953.
1
,

\\'" e ,rish no\v to apply the standards of the employer-exnployee relationship as defined in 35-1-4:! and
a.)-1-4:3 to the plaintiff and show thereby that even
under those standards, the plaintiff is not an employee
of either of the defendants.
'fhe real test as to \vhether a person is an employee
under the standards of 35-1-42 is this: Does the employer supervise and control the employee's work as
to the xnanner of the work or how it is to be performed~
In the case before the court the work of mixing concrete
is done at l . . tah Sand and Gravel yards at North Salt
l~ake. The plaintiff comes and goes to job sites as a
truek driYer as he is directed, supervised and controlled
hy his O\vn etnployer, the Utah Sand and Gravel Company . ..:\ t the defendant's job site in this case, the plaintiff\ duty. as usual 'vhen delivering cement, was solely
to deliYer the ready-mix and then leave. ''That the
defendants did with the cement and how they went
about using it "·as of no concern to plaintiff. And, the
Chureh's only concern was that the cement be up to
specifications or that it conform to what was ordered.
Ho,\· lTtah Sand and Gravel acquired the material or
th~ir manner and method of mixing it, or ho'v they
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delivered it and unloaded it into the crane bucket provided for such purpose was of no concern to the Church.
All it was concerned about was that at a certain ti1ne
and a certain place a certain mixture be placed in a
bucket which they provided. The fact is, in this case,
that there was not anyone associated with any of the
defendants around to say or do or make any comment
as to ho"v plaintiff went about the job of dumping the
cement into the crane bucket.
Furthermore, plaintiff qualifies as an "independent
contractor" as defined in 35-1-42, which specifically
relieves him of an employee relationship with either
the Crane Company or the Church by the standards,
extensive as they are, of that section. Representing his
own employer, the Utah Sand and Gravel Company,
plaintiff was "engaged only in the performance of a
definite job or piece of work" in seeing that the cement
that was ordered was delieverd to the job. Such process
of delivery was "subordinate to the employer only in
effecting a result in accordance with the employer's
design"and he was "independent of the employer in all
that pertains to the execution of the work" and he was
"not subject to the rule or control of the employer."
No one among the defendants gave plaintiff or any of
his fellow truck drivers at Utah Sand and Gravel any
instructions, and none were in order or appropriate,
for their job upon reaching the construction site 'vas
tnerely to dump the cement into the bucket.
In no way can it be said that plaintiff was engaged
in common employment with either the employees of
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the defendant. l:rane l~on1pany. or the defendant, the
Chureh .. \" bet,veen the Church and the Crane Cotnpnny. their etnployees did, in fact, have a degree of
t•lo'-ieness in their relationship. They conferred as to
what they should do, and as found as a matter of law
hy the trial court, there was no employer-employee relationship bet,veen them just as there was none as between
the plaintiff and either of the defendants.

1{11:-L\L MEANING AND EFFECT OF
a.>-1-42, U.C.A. 1953.
'riiJ1~

1\n etnployer as defined in the .1\.ct must secure
l'Oillpensation for his employees in one of three ways
as set forth in 35-1-45. That is, an employer 1nust secure
rotnpensation for his employees as the term employee is
defined in 35-1-43. 35-1-42 does not require a subcontractor of the e1nployer to insure such employer's
etnployees. 'fhe subcontractor in such a job site situation
is not the "'etnployer" and therefore does not enjoy the
inuuunity from suit by an employee that the "employer"
enjoys. 1,he purpose of defining employer to include
employees of a subcontractor as provided in 35-1-42
''"as to protect the compensation rights of employees.
It "·as not intended to relieve subcontractors of their
eonuuon la"· responsibilities. Therefore, when in 35-160 "·e read that an employee's right to compensation is
his exrlusiYe right against his employer and his employer"s officers, agents or other employees, we are to
,~.dYe the usual or common la"" meaning to such terms.
i\n e1uployer's "officers", "agents", and "employees"
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as used in 35-1-60 does not include an employer's subcontractors. Therefore, 35-1-42 prevents an injured
employee on a job site, whor has received compensation,
from suing the principal, or prime contractor or "employer" because he is not a third party. But a subcontractor on that job may be sued by any employee including an employee directly employed by the "employer".
See Brown vs. Arrington Construction Company, 262
Pac. 2nd 789 (Idaho) . This case has an excellent discussion as to this problem. The Utah and Idaho statutes
are not too dissimilar. ,.fhis case, incidentally, is a case
that is very similar to the facts of the case now before
the court with reference to the principles of negligence.
The facts of that case as they apply to the issue now
under discussion are dissimilar, however, in that in the
Idaho case the plaintiff was employed by the "employer"
and was suing a subcontractor of the "employer" even
though the employer directed the work of the subcontractor, whereas, in this case plaintiff is not an employee of the "employer" but is an employee of a business visitor who was entirely independent of the "employer". Nevertheless, the Idaho court permitted the
suit, saying the subcontarctor was a third party in spite
of the fact that the plaintiff and defendant subcontractor were in "common employment".

THE CASES CITED IN DEFENDANTS'
MEMORANDUM ARE NOT APPLICABLE
'1.,0 THIS CASE.
,.fhe treatment that is given to the rights of plain-
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tiffs to sue third parties after such plaintiffs have received industrial eo1npensation vary considerably among
the states, so much so that it is essential that each
stutute be checked carefully before citing cases to support an interpretation of a statute in another state.

'ehe first case that respondents cite is Murray v-s.
\Vnsatch Grading Company (1929), 73 Utah 430, 274
P:!d H40 . ..c\s noted by respondents' comments the facts
are clearly distinguishable from the case at bar. The
defendant in that case had borrowed an employee of
the Railroad Company. Although the employee's pay
cante from the Railroad Company, that Company was
reitnbursed for the wage by defendant. The plaintiff
etnployee was doing and generally engaged in the work
of' defendant. The court makes this very clear when it
says:
"The plaintiff when injured was working under an express contract of hire, and was engaged
in the usual course of the business or occupation
of the defendant. According to plaintiff's testimony, he was engaged in placing a chain around
a large rock so that a team driven by one of
defendant's employees could remove the same
from the railroad track, when another tea1n
driven by another employee of the defendant so
moved a telephone pole that it rolled against
plaintiff's leg and caused the injury complained
of. It was the duty of the defendant to keep the
railroad track clear-that "·as its business or occupation. The plaintiff. at the time of his injury,
was engaged in that business or occupation. Ob,·iously, if the plaintiff had sought compensation
under the Workmen's Compensation Act, the
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defendant would have been without any defense
under the facts as shown by this record."
Respondent next cites the Oregon case of Pruett
vs. Lininger (1960), 224 Ore. 614, 356 P2d 547.
Here again the plaintiff was an employee of the
general contractor or "employer". The third party
defendant owned and operated the crane which also
supplied the ready-mix concrete and had been hired
by the general contractor. Therefore, the fact situation
does not correspond with the case at bar. Under the
fact situation of the Pruett case the Oregon statute
quoted in the opinion clearly prevented the plaintiff
from suing the Crane Company as a third party. The
Oregon statute applicable reads in part:
O.R.S. 656.154
'' (I) If the injury to a workman is due to the
negligence or wrong of a third person not in the
same employ, the injured workman, * * * may
elect to seek a remedy against such third person.
However, no action shall be brought against any
such third person if he or his workman causing
the injury was, at the time of the injury, on
premises over which he had joint supervision and
control with the employer of the injured workman and was an employer subject to O.R.S.
656.002 to 656.590."

" ( 2) As used in this section, 'premises' means
the place where the employer or his workm~n
causing the injury, and the employer of the Injured workman, are engaged in the furtherance
of a common enterprise on the accomplishment
of the same or related purposes in operation."
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In the I>ruett case, the employer 'vas a general
bridge eontractor "·hose employee "·as the plaintiff
und the plaintiff brought the action against the owner
of a crane being rented by the plaintiff's employer to
use in pouring concrete. All were working on the sa1ne
job and on the same premises 'vhen the accident occurred. 'fhe court said:
''If the third party causing the injury 'vas
negligent, a third party action will lie unless
barred by O.R.S. 656.154 * * * . If the third
party causing the injury was negligent, it 'vas
also covered by the workmen's compensation act,
which is the situation now before the court, a
third party action authorized by O.R.S. 656.15-J.
is nevertheless available unless the two employees
were engaged in the performance of component
parts of an undertaking on premises occupied
by the workmen of both covered employers".
Thus, the facts of that case do not correspond
'vith the case now before the court, and the Oregon
statute specifically prevents a third party suit in that
fact situation. 'fhat case is therefore dissimilar as to
both the facts and the law when applied to the instant
ease.
'fhe next case cited by respondents is the Idaho
rase of Cloughley vs. Orange 'Transportation Company
( 1958), 80 Idaho 226, 327 P2d 369. The facts in this
case are dissimilar from the facts of the case at bar for
the follo,ving reasons:
(I) The driver in the Idaho case was in fact loaned

as a temporary employee of the "employer" and did
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in fact receive directions and was controlled by and was
under the supervision of the superintendent of the
"employer".
( 2) The temporary loaning of the driver to the
"employer" was done pursuant to a custo1n and a rule
of the carriers association approved by the ICC, 'rhich
-provided that where large and heavy equipment, such
as was involved in that case, was loaded and unloaded,
such loading or unloading was performed by the shipper or consignee as the case may be. The plaintiff in
that case was an employee of the "employer" and he
was suing the truck driver. We thus have a true situation of common employment which does not come within
the facts and principles of the case at bar nor come
within the facts and principles involved in the Idaho
case of Brown vs. Arrington Construction Company
above cited.
Respondents then refer to the Massachusetts case
of McPadden vs. W. J. Halloran Company (1958),
338 Mass. 189, 154 NE 2d 582.
'l,his Massachusetts case is one where the plaintiff
"~as an employee of the same company which had
e1nployed the Stafford Iron Works to do certain "work
for it". Thus, there was a true common employee situation. The Stafford Iron Works was doing work for
the "employer" of the plaintiff, who was also an employee of the "employer". Such facts are clearly
distinguished fro1n the case at bar.
The next case cited by defendant Is Sutton rs.
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lrulustriall,omtnission of Utah, 9 lTtah 2nd 339, where
the fut·ts are obviously not applicable to the case before
the court.
'l'he next case cited by defendant is Plewe Construction l~otnpauy vs. Industrial Commission of Utah,
1~1 Utah 375, which is another case where the "etnployer, exercised supervision and control over the
\rork done by the person seeking industrial compensation. It should be noted that all of the Utah cases
cited above by defendants were cases where the party
involved 'vas seeking industrial compensation by bringing action against the Industrial Commissior1. Also,
these cases involved an interpretation of 35-1-42. The
issue in those cases generally involve the problem of
'"hether the general contractor exercised supervision
and control over an employee of a subcontractor.
Our objection to the cases cited by respondents is
sintply that they involve fact premises and in some instances la,vs which are neither similar or applicable to
the facts and circumstances of the case now before
the court.

REPL l~ TO RESPONDENTS' POINT VI
Under this point respondents examine only the
first t'vo special interrogatories and answers, and isolate
them from the other special questions and answers.
Before we point out the nature of respondents'
errors in their analysis of the special verdict, we wish
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to comment on these special interrogatories as a ,vhole.
e believe-and we feel sure the trial judge agreesthat in a calmer and more deliberate atmosphere than
1vas present during the formulation of these interrogatories, a better job could have been done and the jury's
task could have been made easier. We believe there
was, indeed, room for improvement. Nevertheless, these
questions and answers, when looked at as a whole leave
no doubt as to the following findings by the jury:

''r

1. 'fhat respondents proximately caused plaintiff's

InJUries.
2. 'l,hat plaintiff was not contributorily negligent.
3. That plaintiff was damaged in the amount of the

verdict rendered.
Now as to Interrogatory 1:
"I.

''ras the defendant, Hyrun1 Peterson, negligent

in the placing or operation of the crane immediately
before or at the actual time of the accident in this case?
Answer: Yes."
There is no dispute in the evidence that Peterson
placed and operated the crane immediately before and
at the actual time of the accident in this case. Since there
\vas no dispute as to these matters and since the evidence
is an1ple on all points there should be no question that
the jury-all of the 1nembers thereof- answered all
points in the affirmative even though the various eleInents 'vere placed in the disjunctive.
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The second question was:

''l)id the negligence of Hyrum Petersen proxi111ately cause, or participate in causing the accident and
injury of \vhich plaintiff complains? Answer: Yes."
~o\r,

as far as a judgment against Petersen and
his employer is concerned it makes no difference whether
his negligence was the sole cause or a concurring cause.
~ \.nd '"hen the jury answered "yes" to this question,
the respondents cannot avoid liability even though the
jury could have had in mind that the defendant Church
also proximately caused plaintiff's injuries.
Other answers that also bring certainty to the mind
th:t t respondents are liable proximately as found by the
jury are the answers to interrogatories 7a, 8, 10, and 11.
7a reads: ''Under all the facts and circumstances

of this case, was plaintiff Haslam guilty of negligence?
..c-\.ns,ver: No."
8 reads: "If, in your answers to this point you have

found that defendant Petersen or plaintiff Haslam was
guilty of negligence \Yhich proximately caused or contributed to the injury plaintiff received, would the accident not have happened except for said negligence?
(Put a cross in the box that fits your answer)."
The ans,ver was: ''Yes, it would not have happened''. Thus, with Haslam excluded as a contributing
party to the negligence, Petersen alone, along with his
ernployer, is left as the one who proximately caused
plaintiff's injuries.
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Then with the further action of rendering a verdict
in a sum certain against respondents and in favor of
the plaintiff as found in ans,vers I 0 and II, there is no
room for_ doubt, not even, we believe, in the minds of
respondents.
We think it appropriate here to quote from a statement of this court in Weber Basin Water Conservancy
District vs. Nelson, II Utah 2d 253:
"Presumptions and intendments cannot be
indulged in to establish a contradiction or inconsistency in the findings or answers of a jury to
special interrogatories, the presumption being
always to the contrary."
Finally we register objection to respondents' statement that one of the reasons the court granted a new
trial was because it believed it had erred in the wording
of the interrogatories. This, we believe, is not only an
incorrect assumption but is contrary to anything in the
record and is not premised upon any expression by the
trial judge off the record in the presence of counsel for
appellant.

REPLY TO RESPONDENTS' POINT VII
Respondents here attack the court's instruction No.
7, claiining that they have been adversely affected thereby. Our discussion on this matter is found on pp. 26-29
and 43-44 of our brief.

''re should point out here, however, that the court

did not use the phrase "wanton or wilfuln as stated by
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respo11dcnts. ,.fhe phrasing used is "wanton or reckless/'
or sirnply "reckless".
l t should also, perhaps, be emphasized that this

subject is nO\\' moot inas1nuch as the jury found plaintiff not to be contributorily negligent and because
plaintiff did not ask for and the court did not give any
instruction as to punitive damages. The only argument
that appellant's counsel made to the jury was that if
the jury should determine that defendants' conduct
was wanton or reckless according to the definition set
forth in Instruction 7, then defendants could not assert
the defense of contributory negligence. We submit
that such an argument would not and did not "inflame
the jury'' as respondents here claim.

REPL , .. 1"0 RESPONDENTS' POINT VIII
That plaintiff was not contributorily negligent is
discussed in appellant's brief at pp. 18-26 with a summary of the matter at pp. 24-26.
Ho,vever, we urge most strongly our exception to
respondents' statement that one of the reasons the trial
judge granted a new trial was because he believed the
e,·idence was such that plaintiff was contributorily
negligent as a matter of law or that the verdict in this
respect \Vas against the weight of the evidence. Nothing
in the record or in the court's expressions off the record
justify such a conclusion.
If there is any truth in the theory that this was a
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reason for the court's order of a new trial, then our
position that the court abused its discretion would be
further enhanced. In view of the evidence and of the
business invitee position of plaintiff, there is a very
plausible view that plaintiff was not contributorily
negligent as a matter of law, and it is inconceivable
that the trial court would impose its own judgment
over the jury's findings on this point.
Even so, the issue of contributory negligence is
also moot in view of the jury's specific finding of defendant's wanton and reckless conduct. If this court
agrees with us that the evidence warranted an instruction as to the matter of reckless and wanton conduct
of the plaintiff, then contributory negligence is no
defense to plaintiff's action since the jury found that
defendants' conduct was wanton and reckless.

REPLY TO RESPONDENTS' POINT IX
Our views on the subject of this court's right to
consider this case at this time and that what the trial
court did in vacating the judgment and granting a new
trial "·as action 'vhich is appealable to this court is set
forth in pp. 44-48 of our brief.
However, we wish here to analyze respondents'
authorities and show thereby that they do not support
their contention and that, in fact, they in some instances
really support our view of the matter.
'l,hey cite Beck vs. Dutchman Coalition Mines
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Con1pany (IU."J~). :! l Ttah ~d 104, ~09 P2d 867, to the
t•H'ct·t that trial eourts have "ride latitude in granting or
denying tnotions for new trials, a point \vith which we
ugrt'e. But there is a litnit to a trial court's latitude. In
thnt (.'ase a jury rendered a verdict in plaintiff's favor of
~l.jOO.OO against defendant for attorney's fees. He was
not satisfied 'vith the amount and his motion for a new
trinl 'rns denied. There was evidence in the record which
supported the jury's verdict, and there was also evidence \vhich would have supported a fee of a larger
a1nount. \\rith these facts the court must conclude, as
it did. that it had no right to upset the jury's verdict.
In a concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Henriod said
that in his opinion the plaintiff's verdict should have
been n1uch greater in view of the evidence which supported a greater verdict, even though there was a conflil't in the evidence on this point. Said he:

''But the writer and this court were not and
cannot pretend to be the jury in this case, and
our personal feelings in any such matter cannot
exceed the four corners of the record made."
Respondents then cite Bowden Ys. Denver and Rio
(;rande
estern Railroad Company ( 1955), 3 Utah
2d 444, 286 P2d 240, to the effect that a reviewing
court \viii interfere with the exercise thereof only if
there is a clear abuse of discretion. Now, this is precisely 'vhat our position is and we submit that such is
the state of the case now before the court.

''r

In the Bo,vdetl case the plaintiff was granted a
ne'v trial by the trial court and this court did consider
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the appeal and did reverse the order for a new trial and
reinstated the judgment. In support of its ne\v tria]
order the trial court had referred to the "Butz'' case
a then recent case, by which it felt bound to grant a'
ne'v trial. This court, in rejecting the applicability of
that authority, had the following important things to
say:
''There is a most important difference between
this case and the 'Butz' case hereinabove discussed. In the latter, the trial court had deprived
the plaintiff of a trial by jury and resolved all
of the issues of fact against him as a rna tter of
law, whereas in this case the matter was submitted
to a jury and the facts were found against the
plaintiff. We reaffirm our commitment that 'The
right of a jury trial * * * is * * * a right so fundamental and sacred to the citizens [that it] should
be jealously guarded by the courts'. But once
having been granted such right and a verdict
rendered, it should not be regarded lightly nor
overturned without good and sufficient reason:
nor should a judgment be disturbed merely because of error. Only where there is error both
substantial and prejudicial, and when there is a
reasonable likelihood that the result would have
been different without it, should error be regarded as sufficient to upset a judgment or grant
a new trial".
Respondents next cite the case of Holmes vs.
Nelson ( 1958) , 7 Utah 2d 435, 326 P2d 722, because
they are impressed with the fact that this court affirmed
the granting of a new trial. In that case there was no
dispute in the evidence, and the evidence was clear as
to the fact that a 31h-year-old child would never haYe
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been strtu:k hy defendant's car except for a set of facts
thnt ineYitably spelled out negligence in the defendant's
t•onduct. In this ease this court dealt at some length
with the problern of trial courts ordering new trials. In
a concurring opinion, l\Ir. Justice Crockett states a
prinriple 'vhich we believe was violated by the trial judge
in the case n<nv before the court. He said:

''The verdict, when supported by substantial
evidence, should be regarded as presun1ptively
correct and should not be interferred lvith Inerely
because the judge might disagree with the result.
The prerogative should only be exercised when,
in the view of the trial court, it seems clear that
the jury has misapplied or failed to take into
account proven facts; or misunderstood or disregarded the law; or made findings clearly
against the weight of the evidence so that the
verdict is offensive to his sense of justice to the
extent that he cannot in good conscience permit
it to stand.''
Although the foregoing rule would preclude, we
believe, a trial judge from granting a new trial on the
record in this case, it is a rule that does not go as far
in restraining of a trial judge from granting a new trial
ns does the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Henriod,
"·ho observes that the majority opinion in the Holmes
case necessarily holds the defendant was liable as a
rnatter of law. Otherwise the court has no right to
interfere "~ith a jury's verdict and order a new trial, for
he says:

''If there is another trial and the jury again
finds no negligence, all that the plaintiff need
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do is to appeal again to this court, and, under
the decision here, it would have to be reversed.
and another trial ordered. This could go on ad
infinitum until finally a jury would hold for the
plaintiff. Hence, the plaintiff cannot lose in this
~as e. It would be more sensible, in my opinion,
1f the case were sent back for the assess1nent of
damages only, saying what the main opinion in
substance and effect has said, that defendant is
Jjable as a matter of law."
CONCLUSION
In conclusion we submit that every issue of fact
raised in this case was clearly and unequivocally a question for the jury to decide, that every issue of law was
adequately covered by the trial court's instructions, and
that if either party was prejudiced by such instructions
it was certainly not the respondents; that the jury
acted upon both the issues of fact and law well within
and reasonably within their exclusive province to act,
and that, having done so, it is not within the trial court's
province or powers to retain jurisdiction of the case
for a new trial; that there are limits to the right of a
trial court to order a new trial and those limits were
clearly exceeded by such an order in this case.
Respectfully submitted,
A. PARK SMOOT
417 Felt Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant
Grant Scott Haslam
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l hereby certify that on this -------- day of February,
196~.

I n1ailed two copies of this Brief by United States
~Iail, postage prepaid, to Raymond M. Berry; two
copies to George H. Searle; and two copies to Skeen,
\Yorsley. Snow and Christensen at the addresses shown
on this Brief.
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